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ESTIMATION OF SEVERAL POLITICAL ACTION EFFECTS OF ENERGY PRICES  
 
 
Abstract 
 
One important effect of price shocks in the United States has been increased political attention 
paid to the structure and performance of oil and natural gas markets, along with some 
governmental support for energy conservation. This paper describes how price changes helped 
lead the emergence of a political agenda accompanied by several interventions, as revealed 
through Granger causality tests on change in the legislative agenda.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Commentators have said that the energy crises of the 1970s almost single-handedly 
created “a selective and conservationist approach, a mental constraint which was practically 
absent heretofore in our consumer society” (Perez-Guerrero 1975, 44), and served as “turning 
points” that defined the following quarter-century of Western energy policy (Venn 2002). Others 
argue that recent price rises are indicative of “crisis again?” (Behrens 2001) because “the legacy 
of that havoc remains, both for good and for ill” (Feldman 1995, 20). These views often see the 
oil crises as rippling through society, altering both consumer choices and conservation 
cosmologies.  
Most studies on policy agendas and political instability do not emphasize price changes 
(e.g., Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 2002; Gourevitch 1978; Baron 1999, 2000). In discussing the 
responses in the economy and the government to the oil price shocks of the 1970s that followed 
the 1973 oil embargo by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), I offer 
quantitative evidence on the shift in the legislative agenda after these events. Congress addressed 
the structure and performance of oil and gas markets, as well as energy conservation. The 
evidence for this comes from an analysis of Granger causality among the policy agenda and 
energy economics variables.  
 The study proceeds as follows. In the next section, I develop the explanation of these 
events and offer a brief narrative on how public officials and others sought to stabilize markets. 
In the third section I offer quantitative evidence on the shift in the legislative agenda. Last, I 
discuss this analysis. 
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POLICY RESPONSIVENESS BEFORE AND AFTER THE CRISES 
 In 1973, OPEC suddenly increased the price of oil (Chateau and Lapillone 1982, 14), 
although OPEC may have gotten a much faster price change than it desired (Perez-Guerrero 
1975, 39). For oil and petroleum products, this was caused by OPEC’s curtailments and price 
increases, although other price increases were due to price deregulation and fuel switching. The 
price (measured in nominal dollars) increased even more dramatically during the 1979 energy 
crisis that came after the Iranian Revolution. Moreover, energy expenditures also increased 
during both crises.  
However, both oil and natural gas experienced decreased consumption and coal remained 
fairly steady. Alternative sources of energy (biomass, fission, hydropower, etc.) made some 
inroads in the composite energy market. However, of the four major sectors, the industrial sector 
experienced the greatest change in the consumption of energy, measured in the reduction in total 
quads.1 The other sectors experienced modest changes, if any. Most importantly, residential and 
commercial use remained the same. Industrial conservation is detailed in Lovins, et al. (1984) 
and Darmstadter, et al. (1983). 
It is difficult to measure consumer reaction because price stability before 1973 means the 
time series is discontinuous (Chateau and Lapillone 1982, 12). The long-term growth rate of 
world energy consumption was around 6 percent after World War II; the reduction in the five 
years following 1973 was between 6 and 12 percent of the long-term total use (Eden, et al. 1981, 
305). Although there is a lag in how market forces affect demand (Darmstadter 1976), John 
Sawhill, former Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration argued, “because of the 
                                                
1 A “quad” is one quadrillion British Thermal Units (BTUs).  
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difficulty of expanding energy supplies, the only short-term option we have for reducing 
vulnerability … is energy conservation (1975, 22). Also, the demand elasticity for oil is low in 
the short term but much higher in the long run because of product substitution or fuel switching 
(Rybczynski and Ray 1976).  
Of course, these changes occurred in a specific environment of energy production and 
consumption. Total domestic production of energy fell between 1972 and 1978. Both the 
domestic oil and natural gas industries experienced decreased output, while coal and other 
sources remained steady during most of the 1970s. Moreover, imports of crude oil increased 
sharply over the period 1973 to 1976; imports of petroleum products fell. Domestic production 
was being replaced by imports from foreign suppliers.  
An important caveat is that the price shocks described here are represented in nominal 
dollars, so over the time scales under study here the impact may be overstated if consumers 
respond to real price changes instead. Data on consumption as measured by the thousands of 
BTUs that are consumed per dollar of real Gross Domestic Product (deflated as chained GDP, 
year 2000 dollars) show that less energy was consumed as GDP grew during this time period, 
although the ability of the economy to rely on less energy flattened out after 1985. This partially 
reflects the point above about the differential impact of prices on consumption in the industrial 
and residential or commercial sectors. More importantly, the question remains about the impact 
of nominal price increases on political and policy agendas.  
The impacts of price changes were different across sectors with industrial users reducing 
consumption while residential and commercial users did not. This characterizes the economic 
response to the oil price shocks but does not address the political impacts. The shocks brought 
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about the first energy policy explosion (Kemezis and Wilson 1984, 199). Was this where 
consumers turned their attention? 
Political Impacts 
 In 1973, energy policy shifted gears from solving narrow problems in five stable fuel 
policy systems to efforts at issue resolution by the president and Congress (Kash and Rycroft 
1984, 21). Policymakers sought ways to respond to an array of pressing issues related to the 
supply and demand conditions for energy generally, and petroleum specifically. The oil price 
shocks of the 1970s occurred within an institutional context that defined how producers, 
consumers, and government interacted in oil markets. My purpose is to provide a short 
description of this institutional context, especially with regard to the development of specific 
governmental responses and policies. I first set the stage for the events of 1973, then describe the 
conditions under which the embargo occurred, and then turn to broader themes that underpin 
these conditions. I finish this section with a review of a number of different responses pursued by 
Congress and the president.  
Prior to the 1970s, economic growth and development were marked by cheap fuels and 
stable supplies. Consumers even experienced little disruption from the closure of the Suez Canal 
in 1956 or Saudi Arabia’s oil embargo in 1967; both caused quantity reductions but not price 
increases (see Blair 1978; Sobel 1974, 1975). National security policy for energy independence 
centered on oil import quotas (Bohi and Russell 1978); these were also incentives for domestic 
oil producers (Randall 1987, 308). Over time, consumption outstripped production and caused 
concern about import restriction. As early as 1970, President Nixon and his advisors understood 
the likelihood of and the need for planning to be able to respond to significant supply reductions. 
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The head of the President’s Oil Policy Committee, George Lincoln, noted the need to prevent 
“an unwise dependence on relatively insecure sources of supply by even as early as 1975” (Sobel 
1975, 32). Wilson Laird of the Office of Oil and Gas warned Congress the Middle East was an 
undependable source. 
A range of issues emerged, mostly related to the underlying quota system that defined the 
conditions under which producers could obtain and distribute oil. These quota systems, which 
are described in detail below, interacted with supply restrictions implemented through import 
quotas. This does not mean other energy sources were completely neglected. Nixon’s first 
comprehensive energy message to Congress argued for improved supplies (e.g., nuclear, clean-
coal), but it also sought a fifteen-fold increase in the oil import quota. Energy market structure 
problems persisted throughout the early 1970s. The large oil firms, on whom early regulation had 
centered, also considered expansion into other energy markets, particularly the acquisition of 
coal and uranium interests (Sobel 1974, 39).  
Firms saw the state of regulation as impeding new investment (Sobel 1974, 73). While it 
was difficult to sort out the evidence for such claims, it was clear that political decisions (or 
gridlock) limited some choices, such as completion of the Alaska pipeline. By 1973, prices 
increased for utility rates, oil products (2 percent), natural gas, and electricity (6 percent); there 
were fuel oil and propane gas shortages in the Midwest.2 The American Petroleum Institute 
reported less than a six-week supply of home and industrial oil (Sobel 1974, 131). The energy 
trade deficit was $4 billion. In February the Administration urged companies to conserve energy. 
                                                
2 Office of Emergency Preparedness (1972) describes the Administration’s conservation plans. 
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In April, Nixon ended import quotas, expanded offshore leases, and established an Office of 
Energy Conservation.  
 The government also erected price supports for oil. Congress passed the Emergency 
Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 (EPAA) during a period of rapid inflation to control prices, 
reduce windfall profits, and insure cheap energy. This priced oil from new wells higher than oil 
from existing wells to stimulate domestic production. Such price controls were an equity tool 
that dated to early regulation of the Standard Oil Trust (Kemezis and Wilson 1984, 196). 
Policymakers struggled over the existence of price controls, though they lasted through the end 
of the Carter Administration.  
OPEC’s embargo came in 1973. Western oil companies had signed the Teheran 
Agreement with OPEC members in 1971; then OPEC held 85 percent of known reserves outside 
of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia linked oil exports and U.S. foreign policy toward 
Israel; in May, Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, and Algeria briefly halted oil exports. In October, OEPC 
pronounced the Teheran pact dead and proposed price increases.3 At the time, U.S. oil imports 
from the Middle East were 1.2 billion barrels per day. OPEC and the major oil companies were 
unable to renegotiate the 1971 agreement. OPEC curtailed production, cut exports, and 
announced increases in prices and in taxes paid by oil companies; within months this was 
extended to ban shipments to the U.S, with other cuts and bans following. Price increases spread 
worldwide. The U.S. threatened retaliation, but in December, OPEC reduced production and 
non-OPEC countries increased prices 60 to 80 percent. 
                                                
3 Some argued the agreement failed due to control over prices, not events in the Middle East. 
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 I want to emphasize two themes that underpin these conditions that describe the pattern 
of political responsiveness on energy prices and consumption patterns. First, the key strands of 
activity during this time were entwined rules that limited domestic crude oil output, specified the 
tax treatment of oil extraction, and constructed barriers to competition from foreign sources (e.g., 
Goodwin, et al. 1981; Kalt 1981). The details of treatment of each of these elements can be 
complex, but one broad implication is that the rules that define the roles of producers, 
consumers, and government in this area are best viewed through the lens of their allocative 
impact. Essentially, the rules dictated the distribution of costs and benefits from transactions in 
this market (Kalt 1981, 3). The evolution of the package of rules up to the Nixon Administration 
was defined mostly through inaction, although there was some selective development of rules 
favoring specific fuel sources. Under Nixon, energy policy in these arenas was targeted mainly at 
“putting out fires”, while in the Ford Administration energy became a “political good” 
(Goodwin, et al. 1981). The Carter and Reagan Administrations represented a sequence of phases 
in which the government moved slowly toward dismantling a number of the rules established in 
the previous three decades, but that movement was glacial and a result of the oil price shocks that 
defined the 1970s.  
Second, given this context, it is difficult to understate the core role of wellhead price 
controls in defining the incentives of producers, and thus the market environment in which 
consumers, producers, and government interacted. Broadly speaking, it is important to see these 
controls as mechanisms that prolong adjustment processes (Horwich and Weimer 1984, 59). A 
full history of the movement that occurred during this time toward a set of price controls is 
beyond the scope of this article (e.g., see Kalt 1981, 17), but the endpoint of the process is 
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valuable for understanding this particular context. The evolution from Phase I to Phase IV price 
controls resulted in a system that discriminated between two types of oil: “new” and “old”, 
effectively based on dates of discovery and extraction.4 These differential pricing arrangements, 
authorized in the EPAA, created layers of accommodation and adjustment issues, including of 
distribution and fairness for those distributors and refiners who did or did not have access to 
domestic controlled oil. Kalt presents intriguing estimates of the rents captured by various 
interests under this system, along with the way in which allocations were handled to sort out 
those rents. As Horwich and Weimer (1984, 83) note, this system and the adjustments that were 
necessary for it to remain even marginally effective in a time when external prices were 
changing quickly, required a level of political redistribution through rule changes that only 
became unraveled with the decontrols of 1981. For example, the 1979 crisis required 27 rule 
changes governing the allocation of gas and middle distillates; over 200 changes were made to 
price ceilings of various refinery products during the eight year duration of the EPAA (Horwich 
and Weimer 1984, 96-97). 
These themes suggest that the events above that describe the slow speed of adjustment to 
price shocks, both by consumers and governments, were structured to a degree by the rule 
packages put in place in the EPAA. Likewise, the EPAA shows that individual pieces of 
legislation can have disproportionate impact on the political economy of oil. That said, together 
these themes show how important the actions of the president and Congress were in this policy 
area during the 1970s, and while those actions were never optimal and often destructive for 
allocative efficiency, they remained important deciders of the direction of markets. 
                                                
4 Task Force (1977) describes the FEA system of controls.  
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 I close this section by noting a number of different responses pursued by Congress and 
the president. Broadly speaking, Congress and the Nixon Administration remained deadlocked 
over energy policy. Rationing occurred. Natural gas prices were allowed to rise. Gas shortages 
followed. Gasoline and heating oil prices rose, and mandatory fuel allocation was ordered for 
selected petroleum product markets. Oil companies urged authorization of an emergency 
industry committee to allocate oil imports. 
 A few conservation-oriented reforms followed. Commerce Secretary Frederick Dent 
launched the Administration’s “savEnergy” campaign, aimed at a 5 percent reduction in 
industrial consumption. The energy “czar” (former Deputy Treasury Secretary William Simon) 
sought rationing or an excise tax to achieve a 30 percent reduction in private gas consumption in 
1974. Some focused on the competitiveness of the markets themselves. The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) sought antitrust penalties regarding the control of refineries and pipelines. At 
Senate hearings a Florida official said “there is no energy crisis … there is a competition crisis”, 
but the Federal Power Commission claimed “workable competition” existed (Sobel 1974, 157). 
Major oil companies reported increased earnings during 1973 of between 14 to 91 percent. 
These proposals sought to respond to the crisis faced by industrial, residential, and 
commercial users. Industrial users were told to reduce energy use and limit the effect on 
production (and thus general price inflation). Residential and commercial users received few 
signals about the crisis. Solutions included deregulation, taxes, and rationing mechanisms, and 
even retaliation against OPEC, but residential and commercial consumers received few policy 
signals about conservation. Nixon’s “Project Independence by 1980” energy plan5 included 
                                                
5 Also, in October 1973 the International Energy Agency was created. 
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converting plants from coal to oil, reducing air travel and heating oil allocations, restricting the 
government’s energy use, a return to daylight savings time, relaxed environmental regulations, 
restrictions on gasoline sales, speed limit reductions, and outdoor lighting regulations. Yet, the 
federal government’s formal response to a four-fold increase in crude oil price was a collection 
of conservation measures not directed at a single sector.  
POLICY DYNAMICS  
 In their seminal 1993 book, Baumgartner and Jones show that political responsiveness 
and policy interventions, like economies, are marked by nonlinear dynamic shifts in the policy 
agendas of representational institutions. Policy issues emerge and recede from the public agenda 
as punctuated equilibria. During periods of emergence, new institutional structures are created 
that structure participation and create the illusion of stability. Just as in North’s theory of 
institutional change and economic performance, punctuated equilibria define the space that 
defines political responsiveness and policy interventions (North 1990). 
 Industrial users reduced consumption while residential and commercial users did not. Did 
the oil price shocks cause policymaking activity by politicians? If so, did they act more with 
regard to supporting the oil and gas industry, including supporting domestic production, or did 
they turn to conservation? What was the nature of the energy policy explosion?  
 Figure 1 offers one view of this space through the lens of the hearings held in the Senate 
and the House on oil and gas issues.6 This figure shows that from 1945 to the late 1960s this 
policy space was roughly stable with few interventions and little responsiveness on the part of 
                                                
6 The data presented here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. 
Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant number SBR 9320922. 
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either chamber to oil and gas issues. This behavior is startlingly different beginning in 1973. The 
chambers drastically increased the number of hearings held on these issues. For the Senate, the 
average number of yearly hearings held rose from 4.0 to 15.1. For the House, the average 
number rose from 3.4 to 20.6.7 This figure also shows a similar dynamic for energy conservation. 
Specifically, no hearings were held on this issue prior to 1973 in either chamber. There was no 
market for this policy until after the events of 1973.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
 Figure 2 extends this point further. The number of public laws passed relating to oil and 
gas issues appears to also increase following 1973. The average number of laws passed per year 
prior to 1973 was 0.3; afterward on average one law was passed every year. However, it is 
important to understand the limits of this figure. First, the difference presented here is not 
significantly different at any conventional level of statistical significance. This means that the 
variation in the production of the legislative branch overwhelms any visible difference in the 
mean production of public laws either before or after 1973. Moreover, the second series, 
showing information on conservation laws, suggests a reality qualitatively different from what 
the conservationist ethic claims about this period as a turning point. The public law response in 
the case of energy conservation laws was ten years after the second oil crisis and fifteen years 
after the first.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here.] 
 On one hand, the political responsiveness of the House and Senate to the embargo is 
extraordinary. The nonlinear dynamics of the supply restriction and price changes of the 
                                                
7 Both of these differences are significantly different at better than p < 0.001. 
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embargo were most noticeable in the Senate and House’s oversight and policy representation of 
these issues. A nonlinear shift in the market for policy followed a nonlinear shift in the market 
for energy. This shift is reflected in the fact that no energy conservation hearings were held in 
either chamber for thirty years until after these events. However, this representation was 
translated into policy interventions for oil and gas issues, but not for energy conservation. Oil 
and gas public laws increased noticeably after 1973, but the peak for the production of 
conservation legislation was well after any type of price changes from either 1973 or 1979.  
 Can we systematically link prices and political activity? It is always difficult to address 
the question of causality in shorter time series like the ones analyzed here, but I offer a level of 
evidence about the possibility of prices causing political activity. Specifically, I estimated 
Granger causality tests after the estimation of a vector autoregression (VAR) model (Granger 
1969; Hamilton 1994). Essentially, a variable that occurs in a time series is said to Granger-cause 
another time-series variable if it can be shown that the first variable’s values provide information 
about future values of the second variable; statistical significance is shown through F tests that 
relate lagged values of the two variables. 
The VAR model includes only four variables: the number of hearings on oil and gas 
issues, the number of hearings on energy conservation, the petroleum consumer price, and the 
amount of petroleum consumed. Price is measured as nominal dollars per million BTUs. 
Consumption is measured as billion BTUs. Both are for petroleum. All data are from the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Reviews (various years). Because of the 
small time series, I estimated the VAR model with degrees of freedom corrections and calculated 
statistics appropriate for small samples; I also included only two lags. The time series includes 
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the year 1972 to 2004. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the dataset. Table 2 shows the 
results of the Granger causality tests. The null hypothesis is that a given variable does not 
Granger-cause another variable, so useful evidence about the relationship between oil prices and 
legislative activity is found if we can reject the null.  
First, Table 2 shows that consumption does not seem to respond to either prices or 
legislative activity. Second, there is moderate evidence that prices may respond to consumption. 
Most importantly, we see evidence of three relationships regarding hearings, prices, and 
consumption. Both types of hearings are Granger-caused by prices. Both types of hearings 
Granger-cause each other. Conservation hearings are also Granger-caused by consumption. 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here.] 
 Again, I emphasize the small samples at work here for developing evidence on the effect 
of oil prices on the public agenda. However, given the small samples and the nature of the 
statistical technique, there is fairly strong evidence that both types of hearings respond to 
changes in oil prices. Hearings on both conservation and the structure of the oil and gas industry 
seem to track one another, but prices are common to both. Hearings on conservation reacted to 
consumption, and as noted earlier, petroleum consumption increased again starting in the 1980s 
– after the policy agenda had already responded through increased attention to the structure of 
the oil and gas industry.  
 The evidence presented here shows nonlinear policy dynamics: public attention, 
measured as the policy agenda of the legislature, responded to price shocks for petroleum.  
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DISCUSSION 
In the United States a primary effect of the 1970s oil crises was increased political 
attention paid to the structure and performance of oil and natural gas markets – along with 
consideration for governmental support for energy conservation. In rejecting traditional 
descriptions of these events as a turning point, I argue instead that politicians responded to 
pressure for policy interventions to support long-term investments in expanded production and 
conservation. It appears that residential and commercial consumers responded to energy markets 
by turning to government rather than changing their economic behavior. In this case, the market 
for policy precedes the market for conservation. 
Of course, even if events had smaller direct economic impact on residential and 
commercial users’ energy consumption, they mostly likely had significant psychological impact. 
People who viewed conservation as a national issue and not just as personal adjustment were 
more likely to conserve (Murray 1974). Individual reactions depended on how people perceived 
the “crisis” – and how they expected the government to respond (Curtin 1976, 45). Government 
may have helped consumers by distributing comprehensible information on the benefits of 
conservation (Darmstadter 1976). The high inflation of the early 1970s may have made Nixon’s 
Phase IV price controls “sound economic policy,” but that is unlikely.  
 Yet, imposing price controls also obscured the way prices can contribute to conservation, 
which may have added to the need for legislation mandating energy efficiency. But even 
legislation did little (Randall 1987, 308). Deregulating the price of new oil did not increase 
supply, given the continued regulation of old oil. Instead, the policy agenda dealt squarely with 
the distribution side of the question. An instant adjustment to a new fuel situation would have 
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lead to instant injury for everyone (Randall 1987, 307). Unfortunately, there were few costless 
conservation measures for residential and commercial consumers since conservation that allowed 
the same level of consumption carried investment costs (Darmstadter 1976). 
 In general, consumer response to the oil price shocks seems to have taken two tracks. 
Those who found it in their long-term best interest to minimize energy use did so. Those who did 
not tried to shield themselves through nonmarket strategies. Most importantly, government 
engaged in a series of policy proposals to stabilize markets and provide protection from rising 
prices. Congress increased its attention to oil and gas issues, along with conservation policy. 
Together, these shifts – both economic and psychological – provided a foundation for new policy 
dynamics in American energy policy that frame our decisions today.  
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Figure 1: Number of Hearings 
 
Source: The Policy Agendas Project, Congressional Hearings Data  
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Figure 2: Number of Public Laws 
 
 
Source: The Policy Agendas Project, Public Laws Data 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Equation Mean Std. Dev. 
Consumption (in billion BTUs) 3.47x107 2670973 
Prices (per million BTUs) 6.716 2.393 
Hearings – O&G 25.363 16.624 
Hearings – Conservation 6.455 7.263 
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Table 2: Granger Causality Tests 
 
Equation Excluded F df  
Consumption Prices 0.481 2  
Consumption Hearings – O&G 0.841 2  
Consumption Hearings – 
Conservation 
1.106 2  
Consumption All 1.200 6  
Prices Consumption 4.184 2 * 
Prices Hearings – O&G 0.379 2  
Prices Hearings – 
Conservation 
0.334 2  
Prices All 1.971 6  
Hearings – O&G Consumption 1.904 2  
Hearings – O&G Prices 4.359 2 * 
Hearings – O&G Hearings – 
Conservation 
8.187 2 ** 
Hearings – O&G All 5.841 6 ** 
Hearings – Conservation Consumption 5.843 2 ** 
Hearings – Conservation Prices 4.120 2 * 
Hearings – Conservation Hearings – O&G 7.830 2 ** 
Hearings – Conservation All 6.527 6 ** 
 
 
** indicates significance at better than 0.01 level 
* indicates better than 0.05 level 
